|
|
|
| The Causes and Economic Consequences of Commercial Banks’ Engagement in Shadow Banking: From the Perspective of Outflow of Capital in Shadow Banking |
| ZHU Jigao, HU Shiyang, LU Zhengfei
|
Center for Finance and Accounting Research, University of International Business and Economics;
Guanghua School of Management, Peking University |
|
|
|
|
Abstract Using Redemptory Monetary Capital for Sale of commercial banks from 2006 to 2012, this paper investigates the causes and economic consequences of commercial banks’ engagement in shadow banking. We find that the Big-four state-owned commercial banks, banks with higher ROA, smaller size, higher loan ratio, higher deposit ratio and banks in more financially developed provinces have less Redemptory Monetary Capital for Sale, which indicates that pressure of financial performance and external financial development level are important factors for commercial banks to do the interbank business. Further study shows that the size of Redemptory Monetary Capital for Sale is positively related to the risk of commercial banks. Specifically, Redemptory Monetary Capital for Sale increases the risk of commercial banks through lowering ROA. But the negative effect of Redemptory Monetary Capital for Sale on ROA is not statistically significant when banks have a high Loan-to-Deposit ratio, indicating that one important motivation for commercial banks to engage in shadow banking is to avoid the negative effect of regulation’s restriction on their financial performance.
|
|
Received: 28 June 2015
Published: 01 January 1900
|
|
|
|
|
| [1] |
巴曙松,2013,《应从金融结构演进角度客观评估影子银行》,《经济纵横》第4期,第27~30页。
|
| [2] |
樊纲、王小鲁和朱恒鹏,2011,《中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告(2011年)》,经济科学出版社。
|
| [3] |
黄益平、常健和杨灵修,2012,《中国的影子银行会成为另一个次债?》,《国际经济评论》第2期,第42~51页。
|
| [4] |
李波和伍戈,2011,《影子银行的信用创造功能及其对货币政策的挑战》,《金融研究》第12期,第77~84页。
|
| [5] |
龙海明、唐怡和凤伟俊,2011,《我国信贷资金区域配置失衡研究》,《金融研究》第9期,第54~64页。
|
| [6] |
陆晓明,2014,《中美影子银行系统比较分析和启示》,《国际金融研究》第1期,第55~63页。
|
| [7] |
裘翔和周强龙,2014,《影子银行与货币政策传导》,《经济研究》第5期,第91~105页。
|
| [8] |
孙浦阳、靳一和张亮,2011,《金融服务多样化是否能真正改善银行业绩》,《金融研究》第11期,第112~124页。
|
| [9] |
吴晓灵,2013,《金融市场化改革中的商业银行资产负债管理》,《金融研究》第12期,第1~15页。
|
| [10] |
肖崎和阮健浓,2014,《我国银行同业业务发展对货币政策和金融稳定的影响》,《国际金融研究》第3期,第65~73页。
|
| [11] |
颜永嘉,2014,《影子银行体系的微观机理和宏观效应——一个文献综述》,《国际金融研究》第7期,第46~53页。
|
| [12] |
张健华和王鹏,2012,《银行风险、贷款规模与法律保护水平》,《经济研究》第5期,第18~30页。
|
| [13] |
张磊,2008,《中国转轨时期的货币非超中性和通货膨胀——兼论中国货币政策双重目标的体制根源》,《金融研究》第12期,第47~62页。
|
| [14] |
周莉萍,2012,《论影子银行体系国际监管的进展、不足、出路》,《国际金融研究》第1期,第44~53页。
|
| [15] |
祝继高、饶品贵和鲍明明,2012,《股权结构、信贷行为与银行绩效——基于我国城市商业银行数据的实证研究》,《金融研究》第7期,第31~47页。
|
| [16] |
Agostino, M. and M. Mazzuca. 2008. “Why Do Banks Securitize? The Case of Italy”, Working Paper.
|
| [17] |
Allen F. and D. Gale. 1994. “Limited Market Participation and Volatility of Asset Prices”, American Economic Review, 84(4): 933~955.
|
| [18] |
Gennaioli, N., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. 2012. “Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility”, Journal of Financial Economics, 104(3): 452~468.
|
| [19] |
Gennaioli, N., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. 2013. “A Model of Shadow Banking”, Journal of Finance, 68(4): 1331~1363.
|
| [20] |
Gorton, G. and A. Metrick, 2012. “Securitized Banking and The Run on Repo”, Journal of Financial Economics, 104(3): 425~451.
|
| [21] |
Gorton, G. and A. Metrick. 2010. “Regulating the Shadow Banking System”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall: 261~321.
|
| [22] |
Gorton, G. B. and N. S. Souleles, 2006. Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization, The Risks of Financial Institutions, University of Chicago Press.
|
| [23] |
Houston, J.F., C. Lin, P. Lin and Y. Ma. 2010. “Creditor Rights, Information Sharing, and Bank Risk Taking”, Journal of Financial Economics, 96(3): 485~512.
|
| [24] |
Iori, G., S. Jafarey and F. G. Padilla. 2006. “Systemic Risk on the Interbank Market”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 61(4): 525~542.
|
| [25] |
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer. 2002. “Government Ownership of Banks”, Journal of Finance, 57(1): 265~301.
|
| [26] |
Li, T.. 2014. “Shadow Banking in China: Expanding Scale, Evolving Structure”, Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 6(3): 198~211.
|
| [27] |
Maddaloni, A. and J. L. Peydró. 2011. “Bank Risk-taking, Securitization, Supervision, and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro-area and the US Lending Standards”, Review of Financial Studies, 24(6): 2121~2165.
|
| [28] |
Minton, B. A., A. Sanders and P. Strahan. 2004. “Securitization by Banks and Finance Companies: Efficient Financial Contracting or Regulatory Arbitrage?”, Working Paper.
|
| [29] |
Rao, P., H. Yue and J. Zhu. 2015. “An Investigation of Credit Borrower Concentration”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 54(1): 208~221.
|
| [30] |
Stein, J. C.. 2012. “Monetary Policy as Financial-Stability Regulation”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1): 57~95.
|
|
|
|
