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| CEO Influence over the Board and Corporate Fraud |
| LU Yao, LI Cha
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School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University;
Ross School of Business,University of Michigan |
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Abstract Using the data of all publicly listed firms in China from 1999 to 2012, this paper examines whether CEO influence over the board through appointment decisions affects the firm’s likelihood of committing frauds. The results show that CEO’s influence can significantly increase the likelihood of firm committing frauds. These results are robust after addressing potential endogenous problems in CEO’s influence over the board variable. We also find that the positive impacts of CEO’s influence over the board on corporate fraud is weaker when firms are located in the places where people are more likely to trust each other, but stronger when firms are located in the places where people are more risk-taking. Finally, we examine one possible channel through which CEO influence over the board affects corporate fraud – by delaying fraud detection.
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Received: 10 April 2015
Published: 01 January 1900
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