国有企业改制降低了劳动者的工资议价能力吗？

doi:10.12094/1002-7246（2017）01-0069-14

Journal of Financial Research

2017, Vol. 439

Issue (1): 69-82 DOI: 10.12094/1002-7246（2017）01-0069-14

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Does Privatization of SOEs Reduce Worker's Bargaining Power?

SHENG Dan, LU Yi

Institute of International Economics,Nankai University;
School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University

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Abstract Bargaining Power is an important factor in wage determination. This paper extends De Loecker and Warzynski's(2012) method of calculating firm level markup to the labor market, and construct a measure to capture the workers’ bargaining power at the firm level. Then we use the 1999-2007 NBS firm level data, and examine the impact of privatization of SOEs on labor's bargaining power. The empirical results show that, the privatization of SOEs significantly reduces the labor's bargaining power. Further, the effect is more pronounced in the differentiated, labor intensive and highly competitive sectors. This paper has important policy implications for improving the capital-labor relationship as well as increasing the labor's income share.

Key words： Privatization of SOEs Labor's Income Share Bargaining Power

Received: 20 June 2016 Published: 18 January 2018

JEL分类号:	E24
	P11
	D21

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SHENG Dan,LU Yi. Does Privatization of SOEs Reduce Worker's Bargaining Power?[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2017, 439(1): 69-82.

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http://www.jryj.org.cn/EN/10.12094/1002-7246（2017）01-0069-14 OR http://www.jryj.org.cn/EN/Y2017/V439/I1/69

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