|
|
The Private Benefit Expropriations during Bank Loan Decisions:An Empirical Study on Entertainment Expenses |
LINAG Shangkun, CHEN Donghua
|
School of Accounting, Central University of Finance and Economics School of Business, Nanjing University |
|
|
Abstract Under the regulation of interest rate, when regulated interest rate is lower than market interest rate, companies need to pay additional implicit capital costs to get the bank loan. We then analyze the determinations and consequences of this phenomenon theoretically and empirically. Using entertainment expenses of companies as the proxy of implicit costs, we find that: (1) Companies who pay more implicit cost of capital can get more bank loan; (2) Banks prefer to offer short-term loan to companies in order to reduce the credit risk in above behavior; (3) The macro environments and companies’ characters could affect the relationship between entertainment expenses and bank loan. The effect of entertainment expenses will be lower under serve credit environment and in high risk companies, but be higher in SOEs and big companies. Our findings are helpful to understand the role and consequences of regulation in financial markets of transitional and emerging economies.
|
Received: 06 June 2016
Published: 18 January 2018
|
|
|
|
[2] |
樊纲、王小鲁和朱恒鹏,2011,《中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告(2009)》,经济科学出版社。
|
[1] |
陈冬华、章铁生和李翔,2008,《法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约》,《经济研究》第3期,第60~72页。
|
[3] |
黄玖立和李坤望,2013,《吃喝、腐败与企业订单》,《经济研究》第6期,第71~84页。
|
[2] |
樊纲、王小鲁和朱恒鹏,2011,《中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告(2009)》,经济科学出版社。
|
[4] |
李志军和王善平,2011,《货币政策、信息披露质量与公司债务融资》,《会计研究》第10期,第56~62页。
|
[3] |
黄玖立和李坤望,2013,《吃喝、腐败与企业订单》,《经济研究》第6期,第71~84页。
|
[5] |
刘星、李宁和张超,2015,《银行竞争、终极控制与债务配置结构》,《会计研究》第10期,第44~50页。
|
[4] |
李志军和王善平,2011,《货币政策、信息披露质量与公司债务融资》,《会计研究》第10期,第56~62页。
|
[6] |
陆正飞、祝继高和孙便霞,2008,《盈余管理、会计信息与银行债务契约》,《管理世界》第3期,第152~158页。
|
[5] |
刘星、李宁和张超,2015,《银行竞争、终极控制与债务配置结构》,《会计研究》第10期,第44~50页。
|
[7] |
吕冰洋和毛捷,2013,《金融抑制和政府投资依赖的形成》,《世界经济》第7期,第48~67页。
|
[6] |
陆正飞、祝继高和孙便霞,2008,《盈余管理、会计信息与银行债务契约》,《管理世界》第3期,第152~158页。
|
[8] |
马光荣和李力行,2014,《金融契约效率、企业退出与资源误配》,《世界经济》第10期,第77~103页。
|
[7] |
吕冰洋和毛捷,2013,《金融抑制和政府投资依赖的形成》,《世界经济》第7期,第48~67页。
|
[8] |
马光荣和李力行,2014,《金融契约效率、企业退出与资源误配》,《世界经济》第10期,第77~103页。
|
[9] |
屈文洲、谢雅璐和叶玉妹,2011,《信息不对称、融资约束与投资-现金流敏感性——基于市场微观结构理论的实证研究》,《经济研究》第6期,第105~117页。
|
|
屈文洲、谢雅璐和叶玉妹,2011,《信息不对称、融资约束与投资-现金流敏感性——基于市场微观结构理论的实证研究》,《经济研究》第6期,第105~117页。
|
[10] |
孙铮、李增泉和王景斌,2006,《所有权性质、会计信息与债务契约——来自我国上市公司的经验证据》, 《管理世界》第10期,第100~107页。
|
|
孙铮、李增泉和王景斌,2006,《所有权性质、会计信息与债务契约——来自我国上市公司的经验证据》, 《管理世界》第10期,第100~107页。
|
[11] |
孙铮、刘凤委和李增泉,2005,《市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据》,《经济研究》第5期,第52~63页。
|
[12] |
唐国正和刘力,2005,《利率管制对我国上市公司资本结构的影响》,《管理世界》第1期,第50~58页。
|
[11] |
孙铮、刘凤委和李增泉,2005,《市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据》,《经济研究》第5期,第52~63页。
|
[13] |
王定祥、李伶俐和冉光和,2009:《金融资本形成与经济增长》,《经济研究》第9期,第39~51页。
|
[12] |
唐国正和刘力,2005,《利率管制对我国上市公司资本结构的影响》,《管理世界》第1期,第50~58页。
|
[13] |
王定祥、李伶俐和冉光和,2009:《金融资本形成与经济增长》,《经济研究》第9期,第39~51页。
|
[14] |
王国松,2001,《中国的利率管制与利率市场化》,《经济研究》第6期,第13~20页。
|
|
王国松,2001,《中国的利率管制与利率市场化》,《经济研究》第6期,第13~20页。
|
[15] |
王彦超,2009,《融资约束、现金持有与过度投资》,《金融研究》第7期,第121~133页。
|
|
王彦超,2009,《融资约束、现金持有与过度投资》,《金融研究》第7期,第121~133页。
|
[16] |
王自力,2001,《利率管制的绩效、影响及政策选择》,《金融研究》第5期,第57~64页。
|
|
王自力,2001,《利率管制的绩效、影响及政策选择》,《金融研究》第5期,第57~64页。
|
[17] |
魏下海、董志强和金钊,2015,《腐败与企业生命力:寻租和抽租影响开工率的经验研究》,《世界经济》第1期,第105~125页。
|
|
魏下海、董志强和金钊,2015,《腐败与企业生命力:寻租和抽租影响开工率的经验研究》,《世界经济》第1期,第105~125页。
|
[18] |
肖作平和廖理,2007,《大股东、债权人保护和公司债务期限结构选择——来自中国上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》第10期,第99~113页。
|
|
肖作平和廖理,2007,《大股东、债权人保护和公司债务期限结构选择——来自中国上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》第10期,第99~113页。
|
[19] |
谢平和陆磊,2003,《金融腐败:非规范融资行为的交易特征和体制动因》,《经济研究》第6期,第3~13页。
|
|
谢平和陆磊,2003,《金融腐败:非规范融资行为的交易特征和体制动因》,《经济研究》第6期,第3~13页。
|
[20] |
中国人民银行货币政策分析小组,2010,《中国货币政策执行报告:二○一○年第三季度》,11月2日。
|
|
中国人民银行货币政策分析小组,2010,《中国货币政策执行报告:二○一○年第三季度》,11月2日。
|
[21] |
Aghion, P., P. Howitt, and D. Mayer-Foulkes. 2005. “The Effect of Financial Development on Convergence: Theory and Evidence”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(1): 173~222.
|
|
Aghion, P., P. Howitt, and D. Mayer-Foulkes. 2005. “The Effect of Financial Development on Convergence: Theory and Evidence”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(1): 173~222.
|
[22] |
Akerlof, G. A. 1982.“Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 97(4): 543~569.
|
|
Akerlof, G. A. 1982.“Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 97(4): 543~569.
|
[23] |
Arestis, P., P. Demetriades, and K. B. Luintel. 2001. “Financial Development and Economic Growth: The Role of Stock Market”. Journal of Money, Credit and Bank 33(1): 16~41.
|
|
Arestis, P., P. Demetriades, and K. B. Luintel. 2001. “Financial Development and Economic Growth: The Role of Stock Market”. Journal of Money, Credit and Bank 33(1): 16~41.
|
[24] |
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy. 2002. “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1): 39~84.
|
|
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy. 2002. “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1): 39~84.
|
[25] |
Bandiera, O., G. Caprio, P. Honohan, and F. Schiantarelli. 2000. “Does Financial Reform Raise or Reduce Saving?”. Review of Economics and Statistics 82(2): 239~263.
|
|
Bandiera, O., G. Caprio, P. Honohan, and F. Schiantarelli. 2000. “Does Financial Reform Raise or Reduce Saving?”. Review of Economics and Statistics 82(2): 239~263.
|
[26] |
Barth, J. R., C. Lin, P. Lin,and F.M. Song. 2009. “Corruption in Bank Lending to Firms: Cross-country Micro Evidence on the Beneficial Role of Competition and Information Sharing”. Journal of Financial Economics 91(3): 361~388.
|
|
Barth, J. R., C. Lin, P. Lin,and F.M. Song. 2009. “Corruption in Bank Lending to Firms: Cross-country Micro Evidence on the Beneficial Role of Competition and Information Sharing”. Journal of Financial Economics 91(3): 361~388.
|
[27] |
Beck, T., R. Levine, and N. Loayza. 2000. “Finance and the Sources of Growth”. Journal of Financial Economics 58(1-2): 261~300.
|
|
Beck, T., R. Levine, and N. Loayza. 2000. “Finance and the Sources of Growth”. Journal of Financial Economics 58(1-2): 261~300.
|
[28] |
Cai, H.,H. Fang, and L. C. Xu. 2011. “Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms”. Journal of Law and Economics 54(1): 55~78.
|
|
Cai, H.,H. Fang, and L. C. Xu. 2011. “Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms”. Journal of Law and Economics 54(1): 55~78.
|
[29] |
Coase, R. H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm”. Economica 4(16): 386~405.
|
|
Coase, R. H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm”. Economica 4(16): 386~405.
|
[30] |
Dhaliwal, D. S., O. Z. Li, A. Tsang, and Y. G. Yang. 2011. “Voluntary Nonfinancial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting”. The Accounting Review 86(1): 59~100.
|
|
Dhaliwal, D. S., O. Z. Li, A. Tsang, and Y. G. Yang. 2011. “Voluntary Nonfinancial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting”. The Accounting Review 86(1): 59~100.
|
[31] |
Fisman, R.,and I. Love. 2004. “Financial Development and Growth in the Short and Long Run”. Working Paper.
|
|
Fisman, R.,and I. Love. 2004. “Financial Development and Growth in the Short and Long Run”. Working Paper.
|
[32] |
Garvey, G. 1995. “Why Reputation Favors Joint Ventures Over Vertical and Horizontal Integration: A Simple Model”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 28(3): 387~397.
|
|
Garvey, G. 1995. “Why Reputation Favors Joint Ventures Over Vertical and Horizontal Integration: A Simple Model”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 28(3): 387~397.
|
[33] |
Gelos, G., and A. Werner. 2002. “Financial Liberalization, Credit Constraints, and Collateral: Investment in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector”, Journal of Development Economics 67(1): 1~27.
|
|
Gelos, G., and A. Werner. 2002. “Financial Liberalization, Credit Constraints, and Collateral: Investment in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector”, Journal of Development Economics 67(1): 1~27.
|
[34] |
Giebe, T., and O. Gürtler. 2008. “Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81(2): 403~420.
|
|
Giebe, T., and O. Gürtler. 2008. “Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81(2): 403~420.
|
[35] |
Goldsmith, R. W. 1969. “Financial Structure and Development”. Yale University Press.
|
|
Goldsmith, R. W. 1969. “Financial Structure and Development”. Yale University Press.
|
[36] |
Grossman, S., and O. Hart. 1980. “Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation”. Bell Journal of Economies 11(1): 42~64.
|
|
Grossman, S., and O. Hart. 1980. “Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation”. Bell Journal of Economies 11(1): 42~64.
|
[37] |
Hadlock, C. J., and J. R. Pierce. 2010. “New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints: Moving Beyond the KZ Index”.Review of Financial Studies 23(5): 1909~1940.
|
|
Hadlock, C. J., and J. R. Pierce. 2010. “New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints: Moving Beyond the KZ Index”.Review of Financial Studies 23(5): 1909~1940.
|
[38] |
Hart, O., and J. Moore. 1990. “Property Rights and Nature of the Firm”. Journal of Political Economy 98(6):1119~1158.
|
|
Hart, O., and J. Moore. 1990. “Property Rights and Nature of the Firm”. Journal of Political Economy 98(6):1119~1158.
|
[39] |
Holmström, B., and J. Roberts. 1998. “The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4): 73~94.
|
|
Holmström, B., and J. Roberts. 1998. “The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4): 73~94.
|
[40] |
Kaminsky, G. L., and S. L. Schmukler. 2008. “Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: Financial Liberalization and Stock Market Cycles”. Review of Finance 12(2): 253~292.
|
|
Kaminsky, G. L., and S. L. Schmukler. 2008. “Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: Financial Liberalization and Stock Market Cycles”. Review of Finance 12(2): 253~292.
|
[41] |
Kim, J.-B., B. Y. Song, and L. Zhang. 2011. “Internal Control Weakness and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures”. The Accounting Review 86(4): 1157~1188.
|
|
Kim, J.-B., B. Y. Song, and L. Zhang. 2011. “Internal Control Weakness and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures”. The Accounting Review 86(4): 1157~1188.
|
[42] |
King, R. G. and R. Levine. 1993. “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3): 717~737.
|
|
King, R. G. and R. Levine. 1993. “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3): 717~737.
|
[43] |
Laeven,L. 2002. “Does Financial Liberalization Reduce Financing Constraints?”. Financial Management 31(4): 5~34.
|
|
Laeven,L. 2002. “Does Financial Liberalization Reduce Financing Constraints?”. Financial Management 31(4): 5~34.
|
[44] |
Lazear, E. P. 1979. “Why is there Mandatory Retirement?”. Journal of Political Economy 87(6): 1261~1284.
|
|
Lazear, E. P. 1979. “Why is there Mandatory Retirement?”. Journal of Political Economy 87(6): 1261~1284.
|
[45] |
Levine, R.,and S. Zervos. 1998. “Stock Markets, Banks and Economic Growth”. American Economic Review 88(3): 537~558.
|
|
Levine, R.,and S. Zervos. 1998. “Stock Markets, Banks and Economic Growth”. American Economic Review 88(3): 537~558.
|
[46] |
Lin,J. Y. 2012. “The Quest for Prosperity: How Developing Economies Can Take Off”. Princeton University Press.
|
|
Lin,J. Y. 2012. “The Quest for Prosperity: How Developing Economies Can Take Off”. Princeton University Press.
|
[47] |
McKinnon, R. I. 1973. “Money and Capital in Economic Development”. The Brookings Institution.
|
|
McKinnon, R. I. 1973. “Money and Capital in Economic Development”. The Brookings Institution.
|
[48] |
McKinnon,R. I. 1991. “Financial Control in the Transition from Classical Socialism to a Market Economy”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(4): 107~122.
|
|
McKinnon,R. I. 1991. “Financial Control in the Transition from Classical Socialism to a Market Economy”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(4): 107~122.
|
[49] |
Pittman, J. A, and S. Fortin. 2004. “Auditor Choice and the Cost of Debt Capital for Newly Public Firms”. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37(1): 113~136.
|
|
Pittman, J. A, and S. Fortin. 2004. “Auditor Choice and the Cost of Debt Capital for Newly Public Firms”. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37(1): 113~136.
|
[50] |
Sengupta, P. 1998. “Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt”. The Accounting Review 73(4): 459~474.
|
|
Sengupta, P. 1998. “Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt”. The Accounting Review 73(4): 459~474.
|
[51] |
Stigler, G. J. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1): 3~21.
|
|
Stigler, G. J. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1): 3~21.
|
|
|
|