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| Efficiency of Corporate Innovation: the Impact of Controlling Shareholders' Stock Pledge |
| JIANG Jun, JIANG Xuanyu, YI Zhihong
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Beijing National Accounting Institute;
School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics;
School of Business, Renmin University of China |
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Abstract Controlling shareholders in China frequently pledge their stock, and some studies have explored the impact of such stock pledging on corporate innovation inputs and outputs. They find that stock pledging by controlling shareholders can lower the intensity of firm R&D and the amount of patent applications. However, corporate innovation ability is a joint function of innovation efficiency and scale. The literature focuses on the impact of stock pledging on corporate innovation scale while ignoring its effect on innovation efficiency or the dynamic relations between innovation inputs and outputs.
Theoretically, there are two competing hypotheses that are potentially related to the impact of controlling shareholders' stock pledging on corporate innovation efficiency. On one hand, such stock pledging may reduce corporate innovation efficiency. First, it increases the deviation of controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights, and it mitigates the monitoring effect of large shareholders, leading managers to engage in more innovative activities. Further, it aggravates the extent of tunneling by controlling shareholders, leading to expropriation of economic resources that could have been used for corporate innovation. Second, due to the risk of control rights transfer arising from stock pledging, it can easily cause controlling shareholders' focus to shift from long-term strategic activity to short-term performance and market capitalization management. As a result, controlling shareholders may ignore innovation activities that play a critical role in establishing companies' long-term competitiveness. The tunneling and myopia effects caused by controlling shareholders' stock pledging may reduce firms' innovation inputs, lead to technological lock-in effects or R&D interruptions, and ultimately reduce corporate innovation efficiency.
On the other hand, controlling shareholders' stock pledging may enhance corporate innovation efficiency. Controlling shareholders who pledge stock may prefer higher risk. This kind of shareholder may have greater tolerance for failure and pay more attention to innovation activities, potentially increasing innovation efficiency. The literature notes that controlling shareholders reduce control rights transfer risks not only by boosting short-term stock returns but also by enhancing long-term firm value. Innovation ability, which is determined by both innovation efficiency and scale, is the key driver of firms' long-term value. The literature finds that controlling shareholders' stock pledging reduces R&D intensity. Thus, controlling shareholders can mitigate control rights transfer risks by promoting short-term performance through innovation scale reductions and maintaining long-term competitiveness through innovation efficiency enhancements. Because improving innovation efficiency can mitigate the negative effect of stock pledging on innovation scale, firms' overall innovation ability can be maintained.
In this study, we investigate the relation between controlling shareholders' stock pledging and corporate innovation efficiency by using Chinese A-share listed firms over the period 2006-2015. Our findings are as follows. (1) Stock pledging by controlling shareholders significantly decreases firms' innovation efficiency. (2) The negative relation between pledging by controlling shareholders and innovation efficiency is more pronounced for firms with higher agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders, or higher risks of stock pledging. This finding indicates that tunneling and myopia are important channels through which controlling shareholders' stock pledging hinders innovation efficiency. (3) The effects of tunneling and myopia have significant substitution effects on the relation between controlling shareholders' stock pledging and corporate innovation efficiency. (4) The negative impact of pledging on innovation efficiency is stronger when a firm's R&D intensity is reduced.
We contribute to the literature in the following two ways. First, unlike earlier studies that focus on firm size, market competition, corporate property rights, the marketization process, government support, factor market distortion, and margin trading systems, we provide new evidence on whether and how controlling shareholders' stock pledging affects corporate innovation efficiency. This paper offers a new research perspective on the determinants of corporate innovation efficiency. Second, our study provides new evidence linking controlling shareholders' stock pledging to corporate innovation efficiency and therefore extends the literature on the economic consequences of such stock pledging.
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Received: 09 August 2018
Published: 09 March 2020
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