社会网络能够促进风险投资的“增值”作用吗？——基于风险投资网络与上市公司投资效率的研究

Journal of Financial Research

2015, Vol. 426

Issue (12): 178-193 DOI:

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Can Social Networks Improve the Value-added Effect of VC ? Based on the Relationship of Venture Capital Networks and Investment Efficiency

CAI Ning HE Xing

School of Management, Xiamen University

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Abstract Using data of listed companies in China from 2004-2013, this paper studies how the VC networks affect the investment efficiency of listed companied backed by VCs. The findings are as follows: first, when network position is central, VC is more likely to restrict the underinvestment but promote the overinvestment; second, syndication will strengthen the effect of network position of VC on investment efficiency; third, after VC exits, the effect of network will disappear. Our findings suggest the VC networks will affect the action of VCs.

Key words： VC Networks Centrality Investment efficiency

Received: 20 November 2014 Published: 19 April 2018

JEL分类号:	L14
	G24
	G31

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CAI Ning HE Xing. Can Social Networks Improve the Value-added Effect of VC ? Based on the Relationship of Venture Capital Networks and Investment Efficiency[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2015, 426(12): 178-193.

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http://www.jryj.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.jryj.org.cn/EN/Y2015/V426/I12/178

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