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| Bank Risk-Taking and Supervision: Does the Intensity of Supervision Matter?Evidence from China’s Banking Industry |
| PAN Min, WEI Hairui
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| Center for Economic Development Research / Economics and Management School, Wuhan University |
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Abstract Using an unbalanced panel data of China’s banking industry from 2003 to 2013, this paper examines effects of the intensity of supervision on bank risk-taking. It shows that, the release of supervisory documents (ex-ante supervision) and the disciplinary punishment (ex-post supervision) are more effective than that of on-site inspection (in the course supervision); The three supervisory behaviors’ risk inhibitory effects on big banks and large state-owned banks are stronger; The risk inhibitory effects of the ex-ante supervisions on listed banks are weaker than that on non-listed banks, while the effect of disciplinary punishment is reversed and the on-site inspection has no different influence on listed banks and non-listed banks.
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Received: 20 June 2015
Published: 19 April 2018
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