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| The “Gains” and“Losses” of Eating and Drinking Corruption: Evidence from Investment and Financing Efficiency of Chinese Listed Companies |
| SHEN Yu, ZHAO Jingmei
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| School of Finance,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics |
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Abstract Using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2012, we study how the "eating and drinking corruption (CEDC)" affects the efficiency of financing and investment. We find that CEDC index increases financing amounts, on average, debt financing increases 101 million Yuan when eating and drinking expenses increase 67,000 Yuan. Further study shows that CEDC decreases investment efficiency. That is, for the under-investment firms, investment efficiency decreases 5.89-9.76% when CEDC expenses increases 1%; while for the over-investment firms, the efficiency decreases 12.29-15.10%. We also find that absence of corporate governance is an important factor decreases investment inefficiency. Firms can alleviate the under investment problem by increase CEDC expenses. This paper casts meaningful lights on the microeconomic effect of corruption on listed companies in the post-crisis period.
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Received: 03 July 2014
Published: 01 January 1900
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