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| The New “Government-bank-guarantee” Model and Investment in Small and Micro Enterprises:From the Perspective of Risk Sharing |
| ZHANG Shaohui, YU Yongze, TAO Yunqing
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School of International Economics and Business, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics;
School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics |
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Abstract For a long time, the difficulty of financing has remained a pain point that restricts the development of small and micro enterprises. In recent years, local governments across China have established guarantee risk compensation funding mechanisms to provide risk compensation for loan guarantees that have been compensated by guarantee institutions, gradually forming a new model of “Government-Bank-Guarantee”. In theory, the new model aims to achieve the goal of risk sharing through government departments, banks, and guarantee institutions in proportion, which helps reduce potential conflicts of interest and behavioral deviations between banks and guarantors in the process of small and micro enterprise loans, thereby alleviating the financing difficulties of small and micro enterprises. However, at present, few studies have empirically tested the impact of the risk compensation and “credit enhancement” mechanisms under the new “Government-Bank-Guarantee” model on small and micro enterprise investment from the perspective of risk sharing. In this context, this article focuses on exploring whether the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model can motivate small and micro enterprises to invest. The findings offer not only important micro evidence for risk sharing theories, but also practical support for the government to further promote the development of small and micro enterprises by improving the construction of a multi-level financing guarantee system.
This article is based on a sample of small and micro enterprises from the “National Tax Survey Data” from 2010 to 2016, and uses the 2014 pilot of the “Central Financial Guarantee Risk Sharing Compensation” policy as a quasi-natural experimental scenario to examine the specific impact of the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model on investment in small and micro enterprises using the difference in differences method.
The research draws the following conclusions: Firstly, the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model has a significant incentive effect on the investment of small and micro enterprises. Following its implementation, the new fixed asset investment by small and micro enterprises in pilot regions has increased by an average of 15.34%, which is a very significant increase in investment. In addition, the higher the proportion of financial special risk compensation funds, the stronger the investment incentive effect. Secondly, mechanism testing shows that the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model is conducive to increasing credit availability, reducing financing costs for small and micro enterprises, and thereby promoting their investment. Thirdly, about 40% of the increase in investment rate for small and micro enterprises is attributable to the growth of production and operation investments, and the impact of the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model on non-operational investments and R&D investments is not significant. The new “ Government-bank-guarantee ” model has significantly reduced the non-productive expenses of small and micro enterprises in building government business connections, and increased advertising and promotional expenses. Fourthly, under the risk sharing mechanism, both banks' loan loss provisions and bank provisions have both decreased, leading to the problem of “free rider” behavior. Meanwhile, due to the heavy comprehensive financing costs and tax burdens of small and micro enterprises, the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model has not significantly promoted their profit growth.
Based on the above conclusions, this article draws the following insights: firstly, accelerate the rollout of the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model and continue to improve the construction of a multi-level financing guarantee system. Promote the development of government supported financing guarantee companies, alleviate the financing difficulties of small and micro enterprises, and increase support for labor-intensive small and micro enterprises. Secondly, strengthen the mechanism for sharing and compensating financing guarantee risks, fully leverage the role of government financing guarantee funds, and moderately increase the proportion at central and provincial levels. Thirdly, in order to avoid free riding behavior by banks and guarantee institutions, we must adhere to the principle of moderate compensation while strengthening the sense of responsibility of banks and enhancing the risk assessment before lending to small and micro enterprises. Fourthly, the effective operation of the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model also requires a sound credit environment, guiding small and micro enterprises to establish credit awareness and reduce credit risks in economic activities. Fifthly, effectively reduce the comprehensive financing costs of small and micro enterprises and lower loan surcharges; At the same time, it reduces the tax burden on enterprises and increases the profit growth space for small and micro enterprises. Sixthly, strengthen financial support for enterprises in key areas, especially guide banks to actively connect with technology-based small and micro enterprises, and further stimulate the R&D investment motivation of small and micro enterprises.
Different from existing literature, the marginal contributions of this article mainly lie in: firstly, it broadens the research on investment in small and micro enterprises from the perspective of risk compensation and credit enhancement. Whereas prior studies have largely focused on the investment and financing of small and micro enterprises from the perspectives of tax policies, the institutional environment, or fintech. How to promote the loan willingness of banks and other financial institutions through risk compensation and “credit enhancement” mechanisms is the key to solving small and micro enterprises financing bottlenecks. This article enriches the relevant research perspectives. Secondly, it provides empirical evidence from the perspective of small and micro enterprises in China to support the theories of risk-sharing. At present, there is still a lack of robust empirical evidence in academia on how to quantify the impact of the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model on investment in small and micro enterprises. This article finds that the risk sharing and compensation mechanism under the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model is conducive to promoting investment in small and micro enterprises, providing important micro evidence for the theory of risk sharing. Thirdly, this article provides new insights into how to further promote the development of small and micro enterprises from the perspectives of internal policy sharing ratios and inter policy linkage. This article finds that in the process of policy implementation, effectively increasing the guarantee risk sharing ratio of fiscal special funds can strengthen the investment incentive effect of the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model and promote the growth of small and micro enterprises; Moreover, in addition to the new “Government-bank-guarantee” model, financing system reform and tax reduction policies can be supplemented to reduce the comprehensive financing costs and operational burdens of small and micro enterprises, which is more conducive to improving their investment returns.
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Received: 29 September 2024
Published: 14 August 2025
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