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| Leverage Ratio, Fixed Assets Investment, and R&D Activities: Implications for How Finance Enables High-quality Development |
| MA Sichao, SHEN Ji, PENG Yuchao
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School of Finance, Capital University of Economics and Business;
Guanghua School of Management, Peking University;
School of Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics |
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Abstract The literature mainly explores the independent effects of corporate leverage change on fixed asset investment and R&D investment. In reality, a firm will take an integrated perspective when allocating its limited resources to either of these investment types, as their risks and returns differ. Fixed asset investments generally indicate low risk and relatively certain returns, but the firm's level of technology will not increase. Conversely, the final outcomes of R&D activities are uncertain, which increases volatility in terms of market profitability and raises financing costs. Successful R&D investment leads to an increase in total factor productivity (TFP), and the firm can earn profit more efficiently. The core research questions raised in this study are: how does a firm's change in leverage affect its decision regarding allocating resources to these two types of investment? What characteristics lead firms to invest more in R&D activities?
We aim to address these questions through a unified framework, so we first construct a three-period corporate investment model to identify the nonlinear relationship between changes in corporate leverage and investment behavior. At the beginning of the first period, a firm's original fixed asset investment consists of internal and external capital. It also holds cash and cash equivalent in hand to deal with potential adverse shocks in the future. In the intermediate period, the firm may remain in two possible states. If the probability is that a bad state will occur, the firm experiences a liquidity shock. It must then resort to its cash reserve to ensure liquidity; otherwise, the firm is forced into bankruptcy and liquidation. If a good state occurs, the firm does not encounter a liquidity shock and therefore invests its cash reserve to increase its fixed asset level or to conduct R&D. The optimal investment can then be determined. When the leverage is low along with the original fixed investment level, the firm uses up all of its cash reserve to increase its fixed investment and does not invest in R&D. As the leverage increases, the firm will make the two types of investment simultaneously so that the expected marginal benefits are the same. When the leverage increases beyond a cutoff point, the benefit of innovating exceeds the benefit of increasing the fixed assets, so the firm invests all of its cash reserve in innovation.
Our model offers three main implications that can be empirically tested. First, the level of leverage can determine the investment behavior of the firm. An increase in leverage from a low level leads to an increase in a firm's fixed asset investment or R&D activities. However, with an increase in leverage from a high level, a firm will not increase its investment because the negative effect of leverage on firm value is dominant. Second, a firm's financial flexibility may affect its investment behavior. Such flexibility is captured in the model by a firm's cash reserve in the first period. Holding more cash in hand in advance offers two advantages. If the firm suffers from a liquidity shock, more cash enables it to hedge against the adverse effect over a wider range. When the firm is free of such a shock, more cash can be input to increase its fixed asset investment or engage in more innovation, both of which increase firm value. Our model shows that when a firm is more financially flexible, it allocates more cash to R&D. Third, a firm with better future prospects is likely to more intensively engage in innovation.
We obtain annual data from the financial reports of Chinese listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2017. We first find that an increase in leverage from a low level can increase a firm's investment. As the leverage increases, this effect diminishes and eventually vanishes. This finding is consistent with our first hypothesis. Second, an increase in short-term leverage is likely to lead to more R&D investment, while an increase in long-term leverage is mainly transformed into more fixed asset investment. Third, the empirical evidence concerning corporate financial flexibility and prospects confirms our model predictions.
This study has important policy implications. A structural view of corporate leverage change can inform the debate. Commercial credit can lead to a leverage increase, which improves business activities because more external funds are available. This can be referred to as “good leverage.” In contrast, increases in long-term leverage and bank leverage lead to an increase in the fixed assets of investment firms with overly high leverage and poor prospects, and particularly for “zombie” firms, which exacerbates the overcapacity problem. We provide clear policy recommendations on how to enable finance to better serve the real economy and promote high-quality development. Measures should be taken to allocate more financial resources to innovative firms and grant high-quality and promising firms more room and freedom to adjust their leverage ratios.
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Received: 18 January 2021
Published: 01 June 2022
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